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Non-Tariff Barriers as a Test of Political Economy Theories
Philip I. Levy*
Abstract
This paper provides a rough test of a broad and prominent class of political economy of trade
models and finds them wanting. The class features governments with weighted social welfare functions,
including the prominent model of Grossman and Helpman. Whether the government is the single domestic
player or there are other players involved (as with the lobbies in the Grossman-Helpman case) the
government ultimately acts as a unitary player in international dealings. Recent work has shown that such
unitary actors care exclusively about terms of trade in international negotiations. This paper pursues the
implication that governments’ choice of trade instruments may offer a better test of the unitary government
framework than existing empirical work. We use the structure of United States protection to argue that
governments consistently choose instruments that sacrifice terms of trade, thus casting doubt on the unitary
approach. We offer a discussion of alternative theories of political economy that could accommodate this
stylized fact. 
JEL Classification: D72, F13.
Keywords: Trade policy, Lobbying, Tariffs, Political Economy.
I.       Introduction 
This paper argues that the political economy of trade policy is more complicated 
than most prominent models allow. In particular, the common practice of treating 
governments as unitary agents in international dealings leads to a testable implication 
about the choice of trade instruments: governments should pick relatively efficient ones. 
In an unsophisticated test of those theories, this paper presents evidence that the bulk of 
trade protection is of a relatively inefficient form that is inconsistent with a central 
prediction of the theories. There already exist a number of sophisticated tests of these 
theories, but we argue that they do not capture the essence of the models they purport to 
test. 
The last decade saw substantial progress in theories of the political economy of 
trade. To a large extent, this progress consisted of providing previously opaque theories 
with solid microeconomic foundations. While theories of weighted social welfare 
functions were plausible and tractable, it was not clear what kinds of interactions among 
agents would give rise to them. Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman’s introduction of 
the common agency approach to lobbying filled this void and offered a combination that 
seemed almost too good to be true: a group of heterogeneous agents involved in a 
lobbying competition which ultimately leads to a single, manageable welfare function.  
This rich simplicity offered the promise of performing more intricate comparative 
statics or institutional analyses while retaining a political economic foundation. That 
foundation was desirable because of the apparently pervasive deviations of trade practice 
from standard normative trade theory, such as the prevalence of protection among 
countries that did not seem to have any market power.  
   
 2
Even authors who might have been skeptical of the importance of political 
economy found it virtually costless to include it in their models. A prominent example is 
Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger’s theory of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). They argue that the trading system is designed to address concerns about terms 
of trade movements. While that would seem to mark a return to the days before the 
political economy literature flourished, Bagwell and Staiger show that many of the 
prevailing political economy models also place great emphasis on the terms of trade. In 
fact, they show that one can abstract away from most political economy specifications 
and present a very general welfare function in which the government cares only about the 
domestic price and the international price. The important common feature of this broad 
class of models is that, for a given domestic price, government welfare will increase with 
an improvement in the terms of trade. 
It is this prediction that we test in this paper. Though Bagwell and Staiger’s model 
and most of the political economy theories to which they refer all deal exclusively with 
tariffs, we argue that they have strong implications for the choice of trade policy 
instrument. In particular, any government with this broad Bagwell and Staiger welfare 
function should choose a tariff over a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER). In general, 
those policies are comparable except that the VER involves the transfer of quota rents 
(erstwhile tariff revenue) to the trading partner country. This matches up very well with 
the theoretical prediction, since the transfer of quota rents is equivalent to holding 
constant the domestic price while worsening the terms of trade. It is precisely this that 
governments are assumed to dislike.  
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Our unsophisticated test consists of using the structure of United States trade 
policy to demonstrate that the vast bulk of protection — certainly as measured by welfare 
cost — takes the form of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).  In fact, so prevalent are NTBs 
relative to tariffs tha t more elaborate empirical tests of theories of tariff levels have 
resorted to NTB coverage ratios as the dependent variable. These NTBs often are 
structured in such a way as to worsen the terms of trade. 
None of this is to argue that governments or domestic agents are acting 
irrationally. Rather, the argument is that through some particular modeling choices, the 
literature turned to models that featured governments as unitary actors, even when 
government policy was the result of domestic competition. We show a parallel to an older 
literature on household behavior, in which certain assumptions (specifically, altruism and 
transfers on the part of the household head) will lead selfish household members to work 
towards the common goal of maximizing household income. Just as empirical tests of 
household behavior have found instances in which households demonstrably did not act 
as unitary agents, we argue that the choice of trade policy instrument has similar 
implications for the unitary nature of governments.  
There are a number of theoretical models that, by design or good fortune, are 
compatible with the prevalence of NTBs. We attempt a taxonomy. One class relies on the 
representation of foreign interests in the formation of domestic policy. Another considers 
a more complex negotiating game than the one in standard models. A third class, which 
we deem the most promising, features non-unitary polities in which there is imperfect 
information among agents and the choice of instrument can send a signal.  
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The next section develops the linkage between weighted government welfare 
functions and the choice of trade policy instrument. Section 3 reviews existing empirical 
tests of the Grossman and Helpman framework and then uses recent U.S. trade policy to 
argue that the prevalence of non-tariff barriers that sacrifice a potential terms of trade 
gain constitutes a more fundamental challenge to the framework. Section 4 considers 
some theoretical alternatives to the unitary framework. Section 5 concludes. 
II.      Developing Testable Implications of the Theory 
The theory that this paper tests is the description of governments as unitary actors 
with linear social welfare functions in a competitive environment.1 In a classic, 
unweighted government welfare function, the government would maximize: 




∑ + TR  
where I is the set of individuals and CS their consumer surplus, F the set of firms and PS 
their producer surplus, and TR the tariff revenue. If tariffs were the only instrument, this 
leads to the classic policy formulation that the optimal tariff for countries unable to affect 
their terms of trade is 0, while it is positive for countries that observe an imperfectly 
elastic foreign export supply schedule. Of course, even in a small country, a tariff effects 
a transfer from consumers to producers in the import-competing sector, but under 
formulation (1) this has no beneficial effect on government welfare. 
The normative prescription for zero tariffs in small countries seemed to offer a 
test for the classic formulation of government welfare as a positive theory. If small 
                                                 
1 In fact, the test applies to a somewhat broader class of models as described in more detail below. We 
focus on this subset for heuristic purposes since it encompasses the popular Grossman-Helpman model. 
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countries had tariffs, the theory could be rejected. Indeed, the prevalence of tariffs in 
small countries prompted the creation of alternative political economy descriptions.2  
A ready alternative formulation is the Stigler-Peltzman political support function. 
We reinterpret that welfare function here as: 




∑ + α lPSl +
l ∈Ω
∑ TR  
where we have simply added a single term to (1).3 That term allows additional weight for 
each producer l in a set of producers with special standing with the government, Ω. The 
weights, αl > 0, can differ for different producers. The virtue of this approach is that it 
offered a straightforward explanation for trade protection: the government cares more 
about the recipients of transfers than those who are being taxed. Thus, it breaks away 
from the uncomfortable prediction of free trade for small countries and it does so in an 
eminently tractable way. The tractability comes from the unitary nature of the 
government; it is easy to operate with a single differentiable objective function. The 
principal disadvantage of this approach is that it is something of a black box. We are 
offered no particular insights into why the government would attach additional weight to 
the welfare of firms in Ω; we are simply asked to believe.  
It might have appeared, then, that the modeler was faced with a choice: one could 
pursue “realistic” non-unitary models in which multiple agents interact, such as the party 
                                                 
2 This simple prima facie test has been challenged recently. Bagwell and Staiger (2001, p. 79), in arguing 
for the importance of terms -o f-trade considerations, warn against mistaking country size for market power. 
Given transport costs, “the issue is not the size of a country’s economy relative to the world economy but 
rather the size of certain industries in a country relative to other industries in that region.” Thus, in their 
example, Mexico would not regard Guatemala as small.  
 
3 More accurately, the Stigler-Peltzman approach said the government valued the rents received by industry 
(Stigler’s original formulation) and consumer surplus (a Peltzman contribution). Baldwin goes one step 
further and allows different weights on consumer surplus and tariff revenue. He then refers to the result as 
the “deus ex machina” government objective function. (Baldwin 1987)  
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competition models of Magee, Brock and Young. (Magee, Brock and Young 1989), but 
these would be significantly less pliable than formulations such as in (2). Alternatively, 
one could adopt the political support function, but at the expense of any understand ing of 
the fundamental forces driving the model.  
The seminal work of Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (Grossman and 
Helpman 1994) seemed to offer a panacea. They proposed that the government cared 
about two things: contributions from lobbies and the general welfare. Thus: 










where Cl is the “contribution” that industry l offers the government and L is the 
exogenously specified set of industries that may lobby the government in this way. Just 
as the consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue terms could fluctuate with 
tariff-driven price changes, the contribution could be a schedule contingent on prices. The 
assumption of a prominent role for lobbying groups matched well with descriptive work 
on the formation of trade policy. 4 Through the adoption of the common agency approach, 
the ultimate outcome of the model was the familiar and tractable weighted government 
welfare function as in (2). This meant that one could pursue questions about trade 
negotiations while enjoying solid microeconomic foundations.5 
While the empirical evidence that governments value contributions is persuasive, 
it is not obvious why the government should also have the general welfare term entering 
linearly into its objective function. In the absence of elections, this might be seen as a 
                                                 
4 See, for example, (Destler 1995). 
5 Among the papers that did this were (Grossman and Helpman 1995) and (Levy 1998). 
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convenient and innocuous shorthand for the broader support necessary for the 
government to remain in power.  
Whatever the reason for the inclusion of general welfare, we can gain insight into 
its effect by noting a parallel to an earlier literature on the economics of the household. In 
considerations of household behavior, one prominent question that could be asked is 
whether the household behaves as a single unit with a single objective function or 
whether the different interests of adults and children interact in such a way that the 
outcomes cannot be characterized as the maxima of a single objective function.  As an 
example of one such alternative, one might see a Nash Bargaining Solution emerge from 
family interactions.6  
In the 1970s, Gary Becker put forward his “Rotten Kid Theorem” (described in 
Chapter 8 of (Becker 1981)). In his setting, there are benevolent parents and selfish 
children. There is a clear conflict of interests between these family members; the parents 
are willing to distribute income to the children, but not to the extent that the children 
would like. The theorem states: “Each beneficiary, no matter how selfish, maximizes the 
family income of his benefactor and thereby internalizes all effects of his actions on other 
beneficiaries.” (p. 183). Thus, under the particular assumptions of Becker’s framework, 
the family’s actions can be modeled as though it were maximizing a unitary objective 
function (family income). The key to the result is that the parents are assumed to be 
altruistic; the welfare of the children enters explicitly into their welfare function. The 
result holds so long as the benefactor is not pushed to a corner solution (with zero desired 
contributions).  
                                                 
6 For reviews of this literature, see (Bardhan and Udry 1999, Chapter  2, Section 4) on the development 
context and (Bergstrom 1997) on theories of the family. 
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Returning to the trade model of G-H, the government plays the role of benevolent 
parent with altruistic concern for the other domestic agents (consumers and shareholders 
in domestic firms). In their adoption of the Bernheim and Whinston common agency 
framework, (Bernheim and Whinston 1986), one of the conditions for equilibrium is that 
lobbies maximize the sum of their own welfare and that of the government (by the similar 
reasoning that if the solution does not maximize joint welfare, then there is additional 
surplus available that the lobby could try to exploit).  
G-H assume that governments are unable to effect the kind of direct transfers to 
lobbies that Becker imagined.7 Thus, tariffs are chosen toward the same end. The end 
result is a version of Equation (3) in which lobbies present the government with 
“truthful” contribution schedules — ones that accurately depict the marginal effect of a 
price change on profits. The government then acts as if those industries represented by 
lobbies receive weight (1+a) in its objective function, while all other agents receive 
weight ‘a’. Thus, we return to the weighted social welfare function of (2), but with the 
apparent added richness of an agency game between competing lobbies. The point of the 
analogy to Becker’s model of the family is that it is unsurprising that the government’s 
altruism renders the intra-country conflicts moot when the country engages in 
international dealings.  
In a series of recent papers, Robert Staiger and Kyle Bagwell have shown that the 
unitary objective function that emerges from the G-H analysis has strong implications for 
countries’ interaction in the world trading system. In particular, they argue that such 
governments are principally concerned with the terms-of-trade implications of their trade 
                                                 
7 In fact, they provide a thoughtful discussion of why lobbies might prefer the absence of direct subsidies. 
We return to this point later.  
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policies.8 This harkens back to the original optimal tariff arguments of Johnson that 
emerged from Equation (1). Bagwell and Staiger note that terms of trade arguments have 
fallen into disfavor among trade economists, but argue that with the advent of theories 
such as G-H’s, they return as a logical implication.  
In a two-good model, they posit their own objective function of a very general 
form: 
(4) WG=W p τ, p
w( ), pw( ) 
where pw is the relative price of the home country’s import good (i.e., the inverse of the 
terms of trade), and p represents the domestic price of the import good, which is 
dependent on the world price and the tariff τ. (Bagwell and Staiger 1999, p. 220). The 
sole restriction they place on this welfare function is: 
(5) ∂W p, pw( ) ∂pw < 0 
This specification of the welfare function has two striking effects. First, Bagwell 
and Staiger show it to encompass the more specific government objective functions of a 
wide range of models, including all those specified in Equations 1-3 of this paper. 
Second, this specification clarifies the importance of the terms of trade in those models. 
The restriction in Equation 5 just says that, holding the domestic price constant, an 
improvement in the terms of trade makes a country better off. This formally captures the 
essence of the earlier discussion concerning the Rotten Kid Theorem. In models of this 
type, though domestic agents have conflicting interests, they interact in such a way as to 
be representable by a unitary objective function. The welfare of the polity improves with 
better terms of trade in the same way that the contentious members of Becker’s model 
                                                 
8 The principal work on which this discussion draws is (Bagwell and Staiger 1999), but see also (Bagwell 
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family all approved of higher income, despite their disagreements about how it should be 
distributed.  
The central assertion of this paper is that this yields a testable implication for 
these models (and for Bagwell and Staiger’s theories of the GATT as well). The test is an 
eminently basic one: If governments are principally concerned with terms of trade in their 
international interactions, we should not see them adopting instruments that forsake the 
terms of trade relative to other available instruments. Specifically, we should not see a 
proliferation of Voluntary Export Restraints or bilateral quota systems in which exporters 
control quota rights. Since these deliver the quota rents to foreign interests, they sacrifice 
the terms of trade gain that 
countries were ostensibly 
targeting through their trade 
policy.  
Figure 1 depicts the 
classic competitive partial-
equilibrium analysis of a tariff or 
a VER for a large country. The 
initial world and domestic prices 
are p0
w  and imports are AD. We 





w . This raises the domestic price to p and lowers the world price to p1
w , an 
improvement in the terms of trade. Alternatively, a VER to achieve the same domestic 
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price p would require the trading partner to limit its exports to quantity BC. This is costly 
to the home country as it reallocates the erstwhile tariff revenue (the shaded boxes) to the 
foreign country.  
In our context, it is important to note that the VER can readily be given a price 
interpretation. Under the VER, the terms of trade will be equal to the domestic price p, 
since the transfer of the quota rents constitutes an additional payment exactly equal to the 
difference between the world and domestic prices. Thus, we arrive at our testable 
statement: 
PROPOSITION 1: Governments with objective functions as in Equations 4 and 5 should 
strictly prefer a tariff to a VER that achieves the same domestic price. 
The proof is immediate. By assumption, the domestic price is the same in each case. 
Under the VER, terms of trade are worsened and the partial derivative in (5) requires this 
to lower government welfare monotonically.  
 
Note that neither (Grossman and Helpman 1994), (Grossman and Helpman 1995) 
nor (Bagwell and Staiger 1999) explicitly allow for VERs nor do they make explicit 
predictions about instrument choice. G-H consider tariffs exclusively, though (Grossman 
and Helpman 1994) features an interesting discussion of the choice between a tariff and a 
more efficient subsidy. Bagwell and Staiger do raise the issue of VERs as a means of 
illustrating the potential costliness of neglecting terms of trade issues. Discussing the 
findings of (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1999) on the U.S. VER on Japanese auto 
imports in the 1980s, they write: 
“… the decision of the United States to “give away” such an 
amount might be taken as evidence that governments in fact do not care 
about the terms of trade, even when the associated implications for 
income are large. This inference, however, does not follow from the 
U.S. VER experience. The relevant policy alternative for the United 
States was not a set of unilateral tariff increases…which surely would 
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have incited a retaliatory “trade war” with Japan, but rather a set of tariff 
changes from the United States and Japan that were consistent with 
GATT rules.” (Bagwell and Staiger 1999, p. 242, note 40) 
 
This raises several points. One interpretation is that governments are playing a 
game with more intricate rules that sometimes require a cho ice between tariffs and VERs. 
If so, it would seem worthwhile to model this explicitly. A second point is that Bagwell 
and Staiger note elsewhere that the GATT allows renegotiation of previous tariff 
commitments. Even if renegotiation were not explicitly allowed, the de facto remedy for 
the Japanese were they to protest U.S. imposition of a tariff would be either 
compensation or authorization to retaliate with a tariff of their own. It would be 
astonishing if the net authorized damage that the Japanese could have inflicted on the 
United States were of the same order of magnitude as the $8.3 billion 1983 dollars 
estimated by (Berry, Levinsohn et al. 1999), particularly in light of the trade imbalances 
that prevailed at the time.9 Third, if the only reason for adopting the less efficient VER is 
the pre-existent GATT tariff binding and this binding is tighter in practice than it would 
appear, that would lead one to ask why the binding was agreed to in the first place. If the 
auto VER were a unique instance, one might believe that this was a rare case in which the 
government faced an unanticipated demand for protection. In fact, as we show in the next 
section, the use of these non-tariff barriers is pervasive and has, at least in the case of 
textiles and apparel, lasted since the 1960s. Finally, if one moves beyond the case of 
automobiles, which were covered by GATT agreements, one saw similar instruments 
employed in sectors such as textiles and apparel and sugar which were largely outside of 
                                                 
9 This was the estimate of total cost of the VER over the entire period of application relative to the 
estimated costs of a tariff. The imperfectly competitive framework used by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes to 
reach this estimate differed substantially from the simple competitive framework of Figure 1. The point 
estimate of costs also had a very large standard error (also $8.3 billion, p. 401).  
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any GATT agreement prior to the Uruguay Round. This casts doubt on the argument that 
NTBs only serve governments as a second-best means of circumventing GATT tariff 
bindings. 
Before we turn to theories of political economy that may be better able to 
accommodate the prevalence of NTBs, we first consider the empirical evidence. The next 
section begins with a description of tests of the G-H theory that do not rely upon 
instrument choice. It then considers further whether instrument choice is a legitimate 
criteria for judging these model. Finally, we present stylized facts about the relative 
importance of non-tariff barriers that do not improve the terms of trade.  
III.     Empirical Evidence 
A.      Existing tests  
The nature of the “test” provided in this paper is unorthodox. It is far more 
common to test a model through econometrics. This, of course, has the virtue that a well 
specified test will let us distinguish between the sort of random deviations from a model’s 
predictions that are to be expected from error terms and the sort of systematic deviations 
that lead us to question a theory. We begin to address this point by considering two 
prominent conventional tests of the G-H model, nearly contemporaneous papers by 
Goldberg and Maggi (Goldberg and Maggi 1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000). Each of these aims to confront the G-H 
formulation with U.S. data. Each is drawn to the G-H model by its more precise and 
rigorous formulation, relative to its political economy predecessors. Each emerges with a 
generally sanguine view of the model, in each case because the addition of explanatory 
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terms to the G-H formulation offered little improvement. Each paper also qualified its 
empirical endorsement of the model by noting a puzzling result or two. 
Oddly enough, each also uses coverage ratios of non-tariff barriers as the 
dependent variable to test this model of the level of tariff protection. Each is deliberate in 
this choice and the justifications they offer are informative. Goldberg and Maggi first 
argue that they avoid tariff measures because tariffs are set cooperatively (p. 1137). They 
note that the same might be said of VERs, so they use one version of the dependent 
variable in which only price measures, such as anti-dumping or countervailing duties, are 
counted.10 They proceed to note that it might be possible to construct a more general 
index of trade restrictiveness, but that this would require data they do not have. 
“At any rate, we note that tariffs in the United States are very 
low (the average tariff is about 5 percent and vary little across sectors), 
whereas nontariff barriers are higher (the average coverage ratio in our 
data is 13 percent) and vary considerably across sectors. In addition, we 
suspect that coverage ratios understate the actual extent of protection… 
thus, the discrepancy between the magnitude of tariff and nontariff 
protection may be even larger.” (p. 1141, note 10). 
 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay offer a similar rationale: 
The use of coverage ratios in place of what in the theory is an ad 
valorem tariff requires the belief that coverage ratios are positively 
correlated with their tariff equivalents across industries. The 
presumption becomes more credible when, as we do, price elasticities 
are included to control for this effect on the right-hand side. The 
computation of tariff-equivalents is an enormously expensive task, and, 
given the state of the art in computational general equilibrium, such 
computations are based on assumptions about market and production 
structures that are merely convenient rather than approximations to 
reality. (p. 145, note 9).  
 
                                                 
10 It is not clear that this remedies the problem of cooperation. A non-trivial number of U.S. antidumping 
cases are suspended or withdrawn, for example, when the relevant parties reach agreement. Further, the 
potential threat of an anti-dumping case could support a collusive outcome that has the effect of raising a 
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There is a curious inconsistency to these arguments. If it were true that the 
fraction of subsectors covered by a non-tariff barrier was sufficiently correlated with 
equivalent tariff levels to allow for careful empirical testing, then the rigorous derivations 
that attracted these authors to the G-H model would be unnecessary. In fact, we have no 
reason to believe that the levels of tariff protection suggested by the G-H model, 
dependent as they are upon terms of trade effects, should bear any relation to the levels of 
drastically different instruments such as VERs or an anti-dumping regime. It is entirely 
plausible that the level of protection (or even the breadth of protection, which coverage 
ratios measure) afforded by these other instruments is broadly related to factors such as 
import penetration or the existence of organized political lobbies, but that simply marks a 
return to the looser form of political economy realizing that preceded G-H.  
Despite these obstacles, both papers support the G-H framework, in the sense that 
variables which are theoretically excluded by that framework are empirically excluded as 
well. Each paper has its own troubling estimate, however. Goldberg and Maggi estimate a 
large weight on general welfare relative to political contributions (.98 vs. .02). They 
explain: “This results seems consistent with the fact that trade barriers in the United 
States are quite low; even in 1983 the average coverage ratio was only 0.13, substantially 
smaller than the potential maximum of 1.” Elsewhere, however, they note that for at least 
one point estimate ((Goldberg 1995)), a coverage ratio of 7 percent in the auto industry 
corresponded to a 60 percent tariff equivalent. (p. 1141).  
                                                                                                                                                 
domestic price. If the threat is credible and not exercised, it is not clear that this would show up in a 
coverage ratio. See, for example, (Staiger and Wolak 1992). 
   
 16
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay pay greater attention to estimation of the political 
contribution process and ultimately express discomfort with their estimate of government 
welfare weights (the term ‘a’ in the G-H model). They report that their estimate  
“is in conflict with the empirical evidence from computational 
general equilibrium studies that have attempted to assess the welfare loss 
from protection. They indicate that efficiency losses are many-fold 
greater than what lobbies spend to obtain protection… Our estimates of 
a suggest that (Political Action Committee) contributions are greater 
than deadweight costs, on average.” (p. 147) 
 
The costly programs they cite, from which the CGE estimates are derived, include 
programs in which exporting countries allocate the bilateral quota rights. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that the high efficiency costs of these programs will not match well with the 
predictions of the G-H tariff model. Further, to the extent that those programs are very 
costly but cover a narrow range of goods, they will mislead estimation based on coverage 
ratios. 
We conclude this consideration of empirical tests with a brief mention of a third 
empirical test (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 2000). They deal with the same class of 
models as this paper and apply the moniker “Standard Short-run Political Economy” 
(SSPE) models. They cite the G-H model as a central member of this class. While 
principally focused on the estimated effects of import penetration ratios, they argue that 
standard SSPE models are limited by the assumption that governments only have access 
to tariffs. By contrast, “Our approach here is to extend the standard analysis, which 
typically focuses on political influence by domestic producers, to consider also political 
influence by foreign exporters and domestic importers.” (p. 289).11 They consider three 
parameters: the political influence of importers (not producers); the weight on foreign 
                                                 
11 They note that this was also the approach of (Hillman and Ursprung 1988). 
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exporters; and the cost of public funds. If the second parameter is highest, a VER is 
chosen. 12 
Setting aside the plausibility of foreign representation in protection decisions, it 
suffices to note that this “extension” in fact marks a significant departure from the G-H 
model. Specifically, while the G-H model fits comfortably within the Bagwell-Staiger 
characterization of welfare, the Maggi-Rodriguez-Clare model would not (with sufficient 
weight on foreign export interests, the inequality in Equation (5) would be violated). 
Since this paper argues that the basic terms of trade prediction of that class of models 
fails to hold, being outside of the class is a good thing. There are, however, a number of 
different theoretical approaches that can avoid the terms of trade critique and we defer a 
fuller discussion of these approaches to Section 4.  
B.       Instrument Choice as a Test 
At a facile level, one could say that most theories of protection could be discarded 
because they fail to provide a full explanation for both instrument and level. This would 
be unsatisfactory since the nature of economic analysis is to simplify. However, it is 
essential to check whether the omitted factors are orthogonal to the question at hand or 
intimately connected. Further, there is a distinction between theories that do not bother to 
explain instrument choice and those that are intrinsically incapable of being extended to 
                                                 
12 There is recent work arguing that foreign lobbying is a significant factor in the determination of trade 
policy in the United States (Gawande, Krishna and Robbins, 2002). It uses data on payments to “foreign 
agents” in the United States as a proxy for otherwise prohibited direct political contributions from 
foreigners. There is reason to doubt, however, that these agents (lobbyists) are being used as conduits for 
funds as opposed to providing general representation. It is not clear what role there would be for non-
pecuniary representation in a G-H model.  Such an approach would seem to fit better with a model in which 
information played an important role.  
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explain it. To consider whether confronting the selected theories with NTBs constitutes a 
fair test, we briefly turn to the literature on instrument choice.  
In a seminal paper on the topic, (Becker 1983) puts forward an argument very 
much in keeping with the class of models this paper critiques. He considers government 
policies more generally than just those on trade and argues that instruments will be 
chosen in an efficient fashion. The rationale is that there will be a surplus generated by 
the move from a less efficient to a more efficient instrument and that this will either 
present a direct additional gain to lobbying groups or diminish opposition making their 
original goal more attainable.  
There is an interesting qualification that Becker offers to his broad assertions 
about efficiency.  He writes: 
“I have assumed that influence functions depend only on the 
characteristics of and the pressures exerted by political groups, and not 
on taxes and subsidies, the number of persons in each group, the 
distribution of income, or other variables. The ignorance of voters not 
only helps determine the influence of different characteristics and 
pressure, but may also make influence depend on other variables as well. 
For example, influence may depend on subsidies if voters mistakenly 
believe that certain subsidies (minimum wages or oil entitlements?) 
contribute to desired goals rather than to the incomes of particular 
groups. If influence functions were affected by taxes, subsidies, and 
other policies, the analysis in this paper might have to be significantly 
modified, including the conclusion that efficient taxes tend to dominate 
inefficient taxes… or that policies raising efficiency tend to have greater 
political support than policies lowering efficiency…” (p. 394) 
 
That will, in fact, be the class of explanation favored in this paper. There is imperfect 
information among voters and they draw different signals from VERs than they do from 
tariffs. 
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Becker offers a subtle interpretation of efficiency which insulates him somewhat 
against the sort of prima facie evidence that this paper offers. Instruments are more 
efficient if the net outcome is more efficient. Thus, a tariff could be more efficient than a 
direct production subsidy if few users were able to take advantage of a tariff scheme 
while a subsidy scheme would be widely available. The deadweight losses would be 
greater for each instance of a tariff, but the decrease in the number of instances relative to 
subsidies would offset the cost.  
In the trade policy literature, attention has mostly focused on the question of why 
tariffs are used in lieu of more efficient subsidies (Rodrik 1995, Section 4). Surveying a 
number of models that compare equilibria under different sets of policy instruments, 
Rodrik writes: 
“In each of the…models, the comparison involves equilibria of 
different ‘policy regimes’, where each regime is characterized by the use 
of a specific policy (tariffs or production subsidies, say). What is often 
left vague is the political mechanism that governs the choice of one 
regime over another. One can think of this choice as being made in the 
first stage of a two-stage political economy model. This appears to be 
the implicit view in the previous papers, but the decision-making 
process for this first stage is not well specified in any one of them.” (p. 
1473). 
 
Grossman and Helpman’s work (Grossman and Helpman 1994) is among those 
that Rodrik surveys. It includes a section arguing that lobbies might well prefer tariffs to 
more direct subsidies since competition could be more fierce in the latter case. Implicit in 
the discussion is that the challenge to the model is likely to come from more efficient, not 
less efficient, instruments. Also, as Rodrik notes, the question is treated as separable.  
It may be worth asking whether it is fair to subject theories that set out to explain 
tariffs to a test on their ability to explain VERs. We contend that it is. Grossman and 
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Helpman are describing “Protection for sale”, not “Tariffs for sale”. Bagwell and Staiger 
are offering a general description of the governance of the world trading system and 
asserting that terms of trade effects are central.  
One should be able to neglect an explanation of NTBs under three possible 
assumptions. First, one might argue that conclusions that are drawn in the realm of tariffs 
can be readily extended to NTBs. A central purpose of this paper is to argue that this is 
generally not so. Second, it might be that the complications that exist in determining the 
levels of NTBs are readily separable from tariff determination, so the two can be 
examined separately. That has been standard practice, but it is hard to justify why the 
same polity would give primacy to terms of trade in tariff determination and willfully 
neglect it in determination of VERs. If VERs are adopted because tariffs are bound, then 
the determination of the levels of each instrument is not independent. Finally, one could 
assume that NTBs are a relatively minor exception to the standard practice of tariffs. We 
show in the next section that the reverse is a better description of the structure of U.S. 
trade policy.   
C.      Evidence on Non-Tariff Barriers 
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any estimate that divides the 
totality of U.S. protection into different trade policy instruments. In fact, any attempt to 
do so would face some immediate obstacles. First, there is the omnipresent question of 
how one would weight the different instruments. If VERs covered 5 percent of tariff 
lines, accounted for 20 percent of consumer surplus loss and 50 percent of welfare costs, 
which figure could one use to assess their importance? We address this by offering 
multiple measures from secondary sources below. A second measurement question 
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concerns more complicated instruments such as anti-dumping policy or rules of origin. 
To the extent that the threat of a dumping action deters competitive pricing on the part of 
a foreign exporter, this will have the welfare effects of a VER but will be difficult to 
measure. Rules of origin in preferential trade agreements have been shown to afford 
protection to producers of intermediate goods within the PTA (see (Krueger and Krishna 
1995)). We are unable to overcome this difficulty, which is equally problematic for the 
measurement of levels and for coverage ratios; one can only make rough guesses at the 
extent of bias. Finally, if we are to offer a “test” of the existing theories, it is worth 
considering what standard we might use to determine the power of the test. Given the 
bold prediction in Proposition 1 that countries with the objective functions of Equations 4 
or 5 should never choose a VER or related instrument over a tariff, one might conclude 
that any sighting of a VER would constitute a rejection. 13 However, without explicitly 
introducing an error term, it is desirable to allow for some aberrant behavior. This would 
pose a serious concern if NTBs were a minor element of U.S. protection. Given their 
prominence, we simply assert that while the cutoff line for rejecting the proposition is 
difficult to place precisely, it lies somewhere well short of the evidence.  
To show this, we consider several sources on the structure of U.S. protection. 
First, and most recent, there is the official review of the United States under the World 
Trade Organization’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism (WTO 1999). It finds that the 
U.S. economy is generally open, particularly with regard to tariffs: 
“Most imports either enter the United States duty free or are 
subject to very low tariffs, all except two of which are bound. Zero 
tariffs apply to nearly one third of na tional tariff lines and the simple 
                                                 
13 There is an interesting discussion of this general point at the beginning of (Leamer and Levinsohn 1995), 
who grapple with reconciling the abstractions of trade theory with the realities of data and whether one 
should take the theory too seriously or treat it too casually.  
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average MFN tariff rate has declined from 6.4% in 1996 to 5.7% in 
1999; the average can be expected to fall to 4.6% once the Uruguay 
Round and (Information Technology Agreement) tariff cuts are fully 
implemented.”  (p. xxi) 
 
There are, however, tariff peaks that are substantially higher in sectors such as agriculture 
and food products, textiles, clothing and footwear.14 
The report notes, without quantifying, the existence of bilateral quotas, 
particularly for textiles and apparel. It also documents 742 anti-dumping investigations 
between 1980 and 1998, of which 44% resulted in final affirmative findings (p. 67). From 
this, we can take only that a range of instruments are applied, without any particular 
sense of their relative magnitude. 
Robert Feenstra provides a survey of estimates of costs stemming from U.S. 
import protection in the mid-1980s. (Feenstra 1992). Blending partial equilibrium and 
general equilibrium results, he estimates the total cost of U.S. protection to lie between 
$15 billion and $30 billion, compared to 1985 U.S. GNP of $4 trillion (p. 166). He goes 
on to argue for reasons why this range might underestimate the costs of protection. For 
our purposes, though, it is interesting to note the decomposition of those costs. The 
surveyed studies suggested that between $7.9 billion and $12.3 billion of the costs were 
due to U.S. deadweight loss, while $7.3 billion to $17.3 billion were due to the loss of 
quota rents. This offers one measure of the relative importance of VERs and related 
instruments — they account for roughly half the cost of protection as compared to the 
costs that would be incurred with tariff equivalents. These quota rent transfers are the 
                                                 
14 Interestingly, in light of arguments about how well informed domestic agents might be about policies’ 
impacts, the WTO Secretariat notes that only 1 in 7 duties are specific, but that specific duties account for 
86 of the top 100 MFN tariffs (p. xxi). Their interpretation is that “such duties are intrinsically more opaque 
than ad valorem duties and can be used to conceal high ad valorem equivalents (AVEs).” (p. 48). They do 
note that the U.S. regularly publishes AVEs for its specific duties. 
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ones that are not supposed to exist at all under the objective functions we are considering. 
We get an even more striking measure if we compare the total cost of VERs to the total 
costs of tariffs. This latter figure is estimated to be between $1.2 billion and $3.4 billion, 
thus leaving roughly 90 percent of the cost of protection as attributable to a VER or 
related instrument.  
In a separate study, Gary Hufbauer and Kimberly Elliott provide general 
equilibrium estimates of the costs of U.S. protection in 1990 (Hufbauer and Elliott 1994). 
They focus on 21 cases that they say account for roughly half the national net welfare 
cost of protection. They report that: 
“The net national welfare gain from liberalization in these 
sectors amounts to an estimated $10 billion, with more than two-thirds 
being quota rents recaptured from foreign exporters and producers, 
mostly in the textile and apparel sectors.” (p. 7) 
 
In another version of their model, they allow for changes in the terms of trade and 
set the world supply elasticities for exports to the United States at 3.0, a value they deem 
conservative. They then calculate net national welfare changes incorporating increases in 
import prices. There are a range of cases for which liberalization would entail a terms-of-
trade loss and would therefore provide support for the class of theories discussed in 
Section 2.15  For these cases the terms of trade losses totaled $538 million, while there 
was an estimated net welfare loss from liberalization of $426 million. For cases in which 
potential terms of trade losses were negated by the transfer of quota rents to foreigners,16 
                                                 
15 The sectors are ball bearings, benzenoid chemicals, canned tuna, ceramic articles, ceramic tiles, costume 
jewelry, frozen concentrated orange juice, glassware, luggage, polyethylene resins, rubber footwear, 
softwood lumber, women’s footwear (except athletic), women’s handbags and dairy products.  p. 28. 
16 These were sugar, apparel, textiles and machine tools. The estimates for apparel dwarf the other cases 
($2,413 million in foregone quota rents and $7,712 million in total gain from liberalization).  
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the quota rents reclaimed under liberalization would total $2,993 million, while the total 
welfare gain from liberalization would be $9,374 million.  
Thus, the theoretical implication of the class of models considered in Section 2 
was that in international dealings, terms of trade should be of paramount importance. 
Instead, we see that for the most part, U.S. trade policy can be characterized as giving 
away quota rents. As noted above, given the transparency of tariffs and the opacity of 
some measures of protection that were not included in these studies, they probably 
understate the relative importance of instruments that forsake the terms of trade. 
Presumably, the rents are being foregone to achieve some other goal. In the next section 
we offer a brief description of models that could fit the stylized fact of pervasive NTBs.  
IV.     Alternative Explanations 
There are a number of papers in the literature that either explicitly allow for VERs 
or offer promising approaches to political economy that might justify them. We do not 
attempt to argue for one over the other, only to group them into broad categories.  
The first category is one in which foreign interests explicitly enter into the 
government objective function. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000), discussed earlier, 
allows the government to place some weight on foreign interests and finds that if the 
weight is sufficiently high, a VER may be adopted. Hillman and Ursprung (1988) present 
a model in which candidates compete for elective office and the probability of election 
increases with campaign contributions. Both domestic and foreign producer interests are 
allowed to make these contributions. They find that tariffs will be a divisive policy while 
VERs are not. Thus, contributions will be higher under VERs and candidates will prefer 
them to tariffs. The advantage of this approach is that one can use more conventional 
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modeling formulations. The disadvantage is that it is unclear why foreign interests should 
enter directly into government objective functions. One might imagine that direct 
contributions from foreign interests would either be illegal or impart a stigma. It seems 
more likely that the weight attached to foreign interests is a reflection of constraints 
imposed through threats of retaliation, for example.  
The second category consists of models in which the more complicated structure 
of international negotiation helps shape instrument choice. (Feenstra and Lewis 1991) use 
a weighted social welfare function of the sort in Equation 2. However, they also posit 
international negotiations in which the foreign country is uncertain about the extent of 
domestic political pressure on the home country. They show how VERs may be 
preferable to tariffs in their ability to get the home country to accurately represent the 
pressures it faces for protection. In a model with imperfect competition (Rosendorff 
1996) incorporates VERs and antidumping policy. Firms are engaged in Cournot 
competition, which undoes some of the puzzle about the use of VERs. As modeled, 
domestic firm profits rise with the VER relative to the optimal tariff so governments may 
prefer VERs. Rosendorff contrasts tariffs and VERs since these are the common 
outcomes of antidumping cases. However, a contrast between quotas and VERs might be 
more apt in a model of quantity competition. As in Feenstra and Lewis, the foreign 
government is uncertain about home country characteristics. Home is explicitly playing a 
game against foreign and Rosendorff solves for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.  
The third and final category consists of models in which domestic imperfect 
information plays an important role. While the models in the second category featured 
imperfect information on the part of the partner country, (Coate and Morris 1995) feature 
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domestic voters who are uncertain whether the politicians in office are good or bad. The 
politician’s choice of instrument sends a signal about his type. Though this model does 
not explicitly address the determination of trade policy, it demonstrates a mechanism 
whereby political economy plays a substantially richer and more important role than it 
does under the Bagwell and Staiger interpretation. 
V.      Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the central paradigm of recent theories of the political 
economy of trade policy is in conflict with the central feature of trade policy as practiced 
— a heavy reliance on instruments that forsake terms of trade gains, presumably in order 
to achieve domestic transfers. This has important implications not just for our 
understanding of trade policy formation, but also for our understanding of institutions 
such as the World Trade Organization that try to facilitate policy coordination.  
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of modeling the political economy of trade is 
finding an interior solution. It is relatively easy to posit the existence of lobbies or other 
forces that have disproportionate power to sway policy. It is difficult to explain why these 
groups may be able to obtain only part of what they seek. One prominent attempt to solve 
this puzzle — the inclusion of additive general welfare in the Grossman and Helpman 
model — resulted in the prediction of a government that acted in unitary fashion and 
sought efficient policies.   
The empirical evidence casually reviewed here suggests that opaque inefficient 
policies may be easier to implement than transparent and efficient ones. This argument is 
not new; Brock, Magee and Young described this as the principle of “optimal 
obfuscation.”  However, it still lacks firm theoretical underpinnings. The provision of 
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such a theoretical foundation should allow the sort of rigorous analysis of trade policy 
that the Grossman and Helpman approach promised.  
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